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Predator in the Primary: Applying the Tort of 
Negligent Hiring to Volunteers in Religious 
Organizations 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With family members weeping audibly in the audience, a Utah 
jury found Aaron Marcos Montoya guilty of four counts of 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child.1 Montoya is a former bailiff at the 
Matheson Courthouse in Salt Lake City, Utah and served as a 
volunteer Sunday School teacher in his local congregation of The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church).2 Most 
Sundays he taught a small group of five- and six-year-old children in 
his Sunday School class with his wife. However, one Sunday when 
his wife was unable to attend the class with him, Montoya molested 
several children, including one girl while she drew a picture of Jesus 
and then again while she prayed.3
As an individual, Montoya has been criminally prosecuted and 
faces potential civil liabilities for his actions. But as in many cases, his 
victims might look beyond the individual who committed the crime 
and seek damages from additional parties, including the church that 
utilized Montoya as a volunteer. Significantly, the context in which 
Montoya abused his victims raises important questions concerning 
whether the church he belongs to can be liable for his actions, 
whether the fact that he was acting in a volunteer capacity affects the 
church’s potential liability, and whether the First Amendment limits 
a church’s liability for the harms caused by volunteers. 
One potential source of recourse that victims of molestation and 
other tortious actions and their guardians may pursue is the tort of 
 1. Joseph M. Dougherty, Ex-Primary Teacher Guilty of Sex Abuse, DESERET MORNING 
NEWS, Aug. 25, 2005, at B1, available at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/ 
0,1249,600158377,00.html. 
 2. Joseph M. Dougherty, Primary Teacher Takes Stand at Trial, Denies Molesting Girls, 
DESERET MORNING NEWS, Aug. 24, 2005, at B4, available at http://deseretnews.com/dn/ 
view/0,1249,600158135,00.html. 
 3. Id. 
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negligent hiring.4 This quickly expanding area of tort law consists of 
actions in which victims seek to impose liability on third-party 
employers for an employee’s tortious or criminal acts; in this way, the 
tort of negligent hiring is similar to respondeat superior.5 However, 
in contrast with respondeat superior, an employer potentially may 
face liability for acts outside the scope of an employee’s employment 
if, among other things, the employer had either actual or 
constructive knowledge that the employee was unfit for the 
employment.6
In spite of potential First Amendment bars concerning religious 
liberty and excessive entanglement,7 some courts have allowed 
victims of various offenses to pursue religious organizations for 
negligent hiring.8 This trend has become especially apparent in the 
wake of the clergy sexual abuse scandals that have rocked the 
 4. See generally 29 AM. JUR. TRIALS Negligent Hiring and Retention of an Employee § 1 
(1982 & Supp. 2005) [hereinafter Negligent Hiring and Retention]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See James S. Barber, Workplace Violence: An Overview of Evolving Employer Liability, 
83 ILL. B.J. 462, 462–63 (1995); see also Rebecca L. Andrews, Comment, So the Army Hired 
an Ax-Murderer: The Assault and Battery Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act Does Not 
Bar Suits for Negligent Hiring, Retention and Supervision, 78 WASH. L. REV. 161, 165–66 
(2003) (discussing differences between negligent hiring and respondeat superior); John C. 
North, Note, The Responsibility of Employers for the Actions of Their Employees: The Negligent 
Hiring Theory of Liability, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 717, 717–19 (1976) (comparing respondeat 
superior and negligent hiring). 
 7. Jamie Darin Prenkert explains the following concerning the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment and the concept of excessive entanglement: 
The specific concern under the Establishment Clause is that the government will 
“involve itself too deeply in [a religious organization’s] affairs” and become 
entangled in the church’s role of defining acceptable religious beliefs and practices. 
Such entanglement concerns stem from the three-prong Establishment Clause 
inquiry announced by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which prohibits 
an “excessive government entanglement with religion.” The Court, in Lemon, 
explained that the determination of whether there is excessive entanglement is 
determined by three factors: the character and purpose of the institution affected, 
the nature of the aid to or burden upon the religious organization’s affairs, and the 
resulting relationship between the state and the religious organization.
Jamie Darin Prenkert, Liberty, Diversity, Academic Freedom, and Survival: Preferential Hiring 
Among Religiously-Affiliated Institutions of Higher Education, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 
1, 43 (2004) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13, 615 (1989)). 
 8. See, e.g., Jane Doe I v. Malicki, 771 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Jones v. 
Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Hutchinson ex rel. Hutchinson v. Luddy, 763 
A.2d 826 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). 
6FIFE.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006  11:44:05 AM 
569] Negligent Hiring and Volunteers in Religious Organizations 
 571 
 
Catholic Church in the United States over the past few years.9 As a 
result of these scandals, some courts have scrutinized churches’ 
decisions concerning employment of clergy and nonclergy in church 
activities at unprecedented levels.10 In many cases, those courts have 
scrutinized the decisions of churches concerning employment in the 
context of the tort of negligent hiring, along with its sister actions of 
negligent retention and negligent supervision.11
In addition to issues arising in the context of the First 
Amendment, it is important to examine the circumstances under 
which institutions using volunteers may face liability as a result of the 
tortious activities of volunteers acting outside of the scope of their 
duties. Volunteers play an essential role in providing and performing 
services within American society. As former President Bill Clinton 
explained, “Service to one’s community is an integral part of what it 
means to be an American.”12 Individuals acting in volunteer 
 9. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 
2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1789–93. Lupu and Tuttle explain: 
The legal fallout from the scandal of the Catholic Church may be even more 
widespread and enduring than the religious consequences. Priests have gone to 
prison for lengthy terms. Many courts have upheld tort claims against dioceses and 
their officers, and First Amendment defenses once thought likely to insulate 
defendants against such claims have been aggressively advanced and explicitly 
rejected. 
Id. at 1792. Lupu and Tuttle further explain: 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a person sexually molested by someone 
acting on behalf of a religious organization would not have contemplated legal 
action against the religious organization and would not have been successful in such 
an action had she tried. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, a 
person who had suffered such an injury might well be a successful plaintiff in a suit 
against the wrongdoer, the ecclesiastical officials, and the religious entity in which 
the individual defendants served. 
Id. at 1797–98. 
 10. See id. at 1847–54. 
 11. See, e.g., Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 748 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1992); Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996); 
Mendez v. Geoghan, No. 984939, 1999 WL 792202 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1999). 
 12. President William J. Clinton, Nurturing Citizen Service, 3 U.S. SOC’Y & VALUES, 
Sept. 1998, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itsv/0998/ijse/voluntee.htm. President 
Clinton further stated, 
Volunteers enrich our lives every day with their generosity and compassion. They 
cut across the fabric of society—from government on all levels to the educational 
sector, from the religious community to health care. They respond to myriad 
unforeseen developments and critical persistent needs. They react to the plight of 
those who suffer from severe weather hazards—in communities devastated by mud 
slides, ice storms, flash floods or tornadoes. Volunteers open their hearts and homes 
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capacities spend innumerable hours each year teaching, tutoring, and 
mentoring.13 However, some offenders have taken advantage of 
relaxed supervision within organizations utilizing volunteers to 
commit terrible offenses against children and others.14 In light of the 
essential role that volunteers play in American civil society and the 
potential that exists for harm to those that volunteer organizations 
seek to serve, it becomes very important to determine the duty that 
organizations employing volunteers owe to those receiving their 
services. Unless the duty owed in hiring volunteers is clear, those 
organizations using volunteers could face potentially smothering 
liability, which could derail their efforts to enrich lives. 
This Comment examines in depth the potential liability of 
religious organizations due to volunteers acting outside the scope of 
their responsibilities, using the case of the LDS Church and Aaron 
Marcos Montoya as a framework. It argues that in terms of the tort 
of negligent hiring, the LDS Church likely exercises sufficient 
control over its volunteers for liability purposes. However, in the 
specific case of Montoya, the lack of actual or constructive 
knowledge of Montoya’s pedophilia at the time he served as a 
volunteer would likely protect the LDS Church from liability based 
upon the tort of negligent hiring. Furthermore, this Comment 
argues that the First Amendment should bar such an action against 
the LDS Church based on the excessive entanglement of church and 
state that could result from a court’s examination of the church’s 
policies and procedures and its analysis of a reasonable bishop. 
Part II of the Comment provides a brief description of the LDS 
Church, its policies, and its organization. It also briefly recounts the 
facts of the Montoya crimes and trial. Part III provides a brief history 
of the tort of negligent hiring and examines the elements of the tort. 
Part IV analyzes the potential questions that arise in applying the 
tort to institutions utilizing volunteers and to religious institutions 
to offer not only shelter and food, but, most important, the hope and support 
people desperately need to begin putting their lives back together. This spirit of 
citizen service has deep and strong roots in America’s past. By nurturing this spirit 
we can help ensure a better future for our nation. 
Id. 
 13. See Jean Baldwin Grossman & Kathryn Furano, Making the Most of Volunteers, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1999, at 199–200. 
 14. See generally Mark C. Lear, Note, Just Perfect for Pedophiles? Charitable 
Organizations that Work with Children and Their Duty To Screen Volunteers, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
143 (1997). 
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generally. In terms of applying the tort of negligent hiring to 
organizations utilizing volunteers, this Part demonstrates that courts 
have generally found that organizations may be liable for volunteers’ 
tortious actions if the organizations have a right to control their 
volunteers. Furthermore, this Part shows that a split in authority 
exists concerning whether the First Amendment would bar the 
application of the tort of negligent hiring to religious institutions. 
Part V analyzes the Montoya case under the negligent hiring 
elements and under the conflicting First Amendment jurisprudence 
on negligent hiring by religious institutions, concluding that the 
LDS Church would not be liable for the molestation because it likely 
had neither actual nor constructive knowledge that Montoya was a 
pedophile at the time he was asked to serve as a primary teacher. This 
Part also finds that the First Amendment should bar a claim of 
negligent hiring against the LDS Church for the actions of Montoya 
because the requisite judicial examination of internal church polices 
and procedures and the creation of a reasonable bishop standard 
would result in excessive entanglement in church and state. Finally, 
Part VI provides a brief conclusion. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: THE LDS CHURCH 
AND AARON MARCOS MONTOYA 
Similar to other churches in the United States, the LDS Church 
faces the challenge of providing meaningful religious services to its 
members while protecting them from individuals who take advantage 
of volunteer and religious organizations to perpetrate terrible crimes 
on children and others. The Aaron Marcos Montoya case is 
illustrative of the difficulties modern churches confront. This Part 
provides a general description of the organization of the LDS 
Church and some of its practices and procedures. Furthermore, it 
provides a background for the crimes committed by Montoya in his 
Syracuse, Utah LDS Church congregation. 
6FIFE.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006  11:44:05 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
574 
 
A. The LDS Church15
The LDS Church, headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah, has a 
worldwide membership of well over twelve million members.16 The 
church has established congregations in all fifty states and in many 
countries across the world. Those congregations are called wards and 
branches and numbered 26,670 as of April 2005.17
Church meetings are generally held in a three-hour block of 
time. During that block, congregants meet together for an hour in 
what is known as “sacrament meeting.” In the remaining two hours, 
children, young adults, and adults meet separately. Additional special 
activities and meetings are sometimes held during the week. 
Children participate in an organization called Primary and spend 
time both in individual classes, divided up by age, and in a general 
meeting, in which all of the children participate regardless of age. 
The Primary is an organized program of religious instruction in 
which children learn basic church beliefs.18 It also serves to occupy 
the children during the course of the adult meetings. 
The LDS Church has a lay clergy in which its leaders render 
services to the church and their congregations while maintaining 
secular employment and caring for their families. The leader of a 
ward is referred to as a “bishop” and the leader of a branch is 
referred to as the “branch president.” Within the wards and branches 
of the LDS Church, church leaders, usually a bishop or branch 
president, ask members to serve in certain positions that range from 
teaching classes to providing janitorial services for the buildings that 
house the congregations. This invitation to serve is referred to as a 
“calling,” and each congregant is free to accept or decline the calling 
when the church leader presents it. 
Among the positions in which LDS Church members serve are 
various positions working with children in the Primary. Those 
positions include leaders, teachers, choristers, pianists, and other 
support positions. Each position works directly with the children in 
 15. Much of the information below is taken from the author’s firsthand experience. 
However, descriptions of the LDS Church’s organization, membership, beliefs, and other 
information can be found at http://mormon.org/learn/0,8672,968-1,00.html. Additional 
general information can be found at www.mormon.org and www.lds.org. 
 16. F. Michael Watson, Statistical Report, ENSIGN, May 2005, at 25. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Organizations Within the Congregation, http://mormon.org/learn/0,8672,969-
1,00.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2006). 
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the congregation, and teachers can be alone with children for as long 
as forty-five minutes to an hour at a time. Primary teachers often 
teach in pairs, but this is not always possible. 
As explained by the LDS Church’s General Handbook of 
Instructions, “Primary leaders and teachers have the sacred 
responsibility to help parents teach their children the gospel of Jesus 
Christ.”19 In addition, Primary teachers are instructed by the LDS 
Church “to seek inspiration from the Holy Ghost in fulfilling [their] 
important callings,” to “love each child and develop a caring 
relationship with him or her,” and to “help open the way for each 
child to receive a testimony of the gospel and the blessing of the 
Lord.”20 The LDS Church cites scripture as the foundation of these 
responsibilities.21
The ward and branch leadership plays an important part in the 
supervision and administration of the Primary. The LDS Church’s 
central leadership instructs, “The bishopric watches over and 
nurtures children in the ward, working closely with parents and 
primary leaders to help each child ‘come unto Christ.’”22 
Furthermore, the bishopric, which consists of the bishop and two 
counselors, is instructed to prepare and interview children for 
baptism, interview children for movement from Primary to the 
general Sunday School, and oversee the ward Primary organization 
as a whole.23
An essential part of the bishopric’s duties in overseeing the ward 
Primary is the calling of leaders and teachers.24 The General 
Handbook of Instructions charges the ward leadership as follows: 
The bishop calls and sets apart a woman to be the ward Primary 
president. The bishop or an assigned counselor calls and sets apart 
women to serve (1) as first and second counselor to the ward 
Primary president and (2) as secretary. A member of the bishopric 
also calls and sets apart men or women to serve as Primary teachers 
 19. THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 2 CHURCH HANDBOOK 
OF INSTRUCTIONS 229 (1998) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF INSTRUCTIONS]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. (citing Mark 10:14 (“Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid 
them not: for of such is the kingdom of God.”); 3 Nephi 22:13 (“All thy children shall be 
taught of the Lord; and great shall be the peace of thy children.”); Moroni 6:4). 
 22. Id. at 230–31 (citing Moroni 10:32). 
 23. Id. at 231. 
 24. Id. 
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and in other ward Primary callings as needed. The Primary 
president makes recommendations for these callings, but they are 
subject to the bishopric’s approval.25
As a practical matter, the bishop and his counselors stand as 
gatekeepers to the Primary organization and its potential volunteers. 
B. The Case of Aaron Marcos Montoya 
In late 2003, Aaron Marcos Montoya and his wife began 
teaching a Primary class of five-year olds together in their Syracuse, 
Utah LDS ward.26 Initially, Mrs. Montoya taught most of the classes 
alone because Aaron Montoya worked full time as a bailiff at the 
Matheson Courthouse while working towards completing a degree 
at Weber State University and was therefore often unable to attend 
Sunday meetings.27 After his graduation from Weber State 
University, Montoya became more involved in the class and taught 
his first lesson in July 2004.28
On December 12, 2004, Montoya taught the Primary class alone 
because his wife was at home with their baby.29 During the course of 
the class, Montoya molested a five-year old girl twice: first while she 
was drawing a picture of Jesus and then while she was praying at the 
end of the class.30 Montoya also molested two other girls in the 
Primary class.31 An eight-person jury found Aaron Marcos Montoya 
guilty of four counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child.32 
Montoya has subsequently pled guilty to additional charges involving 
the sexual molestation of six different victims ranging in age from 
three to eleven.33
 25. Id. 
 26. Dougherty, supra note 2, at B4. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Dougherty, supra note 1, at B1. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Associated Press, Ex-LDS Primary Teacher Gets Another Sentence, DESERET 
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 24, 2005, at B5, available at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/ 
0,1249,635155625,00.html [hereinafter Another Sentence]. 
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III. THE TORT OF NEGLIGENT HIRING 
As it exists today, the tort of negligent hiring provides plaintiffs 
with a mechanism for holding employers liable for the tortious 
actions of their employees that fall outside of the scope of their 
employment. This is legally significant because employers may be 
held liable in situations in which no liability would exist under 
respondeat superior. The following briefly describes the origins and 
development of the tort and then examines the elements of a prima 
facie negligent hiring claim. 
A. The History of the Tort of Negligent Hiring 
The tort of negligent hiring emerged initially as an exception to 
the common law fellow servant rule.34 The fellow servant rule 
traditionally absolved employers from the liability they would 
otherwise face for torts committed among employees.35 For example, 
early employers often escaped liability for workplace violence and 
unlawful harassment among their employees.36 To ameliorate the 
harshness of the fellow servant rule, courts began allowing causes of 
actions for the negligent hiring of employees in the early 1900s.37 
Where employees were previously unable to pursue an action against 
their employers for the actions of fellow employees, negligent hiring 
now allowed them to seek such recourse.38
Courts first recognized the cause of action of negligent hiring in 
this initial form in Ballard’s Administratrix v. Louisville & Nashville 
Railroad Co. in 1908.39 In this case, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
held that “an employer could be liable for negligently hiring an 
employee who caused injury to a fellow employee if the act that 
 34. Mark Minuti, Note, Employer Liability Under the Doctrine of Negligent Hiring: 
Suggested Methods for Avoiding the Hiring of Dangerous Employees, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 501, 
502 (1988). 
 35. Id. See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 525–37 (4th 
ed. 1971). 
 36. See Lindbergh Porter, Jr., Employment Torts: High Risk Components of Wrongful 
Discharge Lawsuits, 548 PRAC. L. INST./LIT. 65, 102 (Oct. 1996) (discussing origin of tort of 
negligent hiring). 
 37. Amanda Richman, Note, Restoring the Balance: Employer Liability and Employee 
Privacy, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2001). 
 38. See North, supra note 6, at 720. 
 39. 110 S.W. 296 (Ky. 1908). 
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caused the injury was within the employee’s scope of employment.”40 
Courts subsequently expanded the tort to include employee actions 
outside the scope of employment.41
The exception to the fellow servant rule resulting from Ballard 
and other decisions was a logical extension of a widely recognized 
common law doctrine requiring employers to ensure the safety of the 
workplace for their employees.42 Subsequently, this duty progressed 
from a duty to maintain a safe work place to “providing safe 
employees because a dangerous fellow employee was seen as being 
equally as dangerous as a defective machine.”43
With time, courts also began to extend the cause of action 
beyond the realm of employees “to create a duty between employers 
and third parties based upon the third party’s relationship with the 
employer.”44 For example, where a department store employee 
pushed and injured a store patron, a Missouri court held that 
[a] merchant owes to his customer, who comes upon his premises 
by invitation, the positive duty of using ordinary care to keep the 
premises in a reasonably safe condition for use by the customer in 
the usual way; and this doubtless includes the duty of using 
ordinary care to employ competent and law-abiding servants.45
Thus, because of the relationship between the plaintiff-customer and 
the defendant-department store, the court held that the department 
store had a duty to exercise ordinary care when hiring employees.46 
Courts further expanded the doctrine in subsequent cases to 
 40. Minuti, supra note 34, at 503. 
 41. See, e.g., Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Day, 136 S.W. 435 (Tex. 1911) (holding a 
company liable for negligently hiring an employee who committed an assault on another 
employee); see also North, supra note 6, at 720. 
 42. North, supra note 6, at 719. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Minuti, supra note 34, at 503; see, e.g., Foster v. Loft, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1309 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1988) (customer brought suit after being assaulted by employee on company 
premises); White v. Consol. Planning, Inc., 603 S.E.2d 147 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (customer 
brought suit after funds were misappropriated by investment firm). 
 45. Priest v. F.W. Woolworth Five & Ten Cent Store, 62 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Mo. 1933) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Smothers v. Welch & Co. House Furnishing, 274 
S.W. 678, 679 (Mo. 1925)). 
 46. See id.; see also Prugue v. Monley, 28 P.3d 1046, 1050 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (citing 
Schmidt v. HTG, Inc., 961 P.2d 677 (Kan. 1998)) (“[T]he existence of a duty to the injured 
party was based on actions against a customer or co-worker which took place on the working 
premises during the time employment services were normally rendered.”). 
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landlords and their employees47 and to actions by employees beyond 
the immediate area of the employer’s control.48 Finally, courts have 
extended the tort to situations where volunteers, rather than 
traditional employees, committed tortious actions.49 Today, the tort 
of negligent hiring remains one of the fastest growing areas of tort 
litigation.50 As it exists today, an employer will be found liable for 
“negligently placing an unfit person in an employment situation 
involving an unreasonable risk of harm to others,”51 regardless of 
whether the injured person is an employee or a customer, or whether 
the person is injured by an employee or a volunteer. 
B. Elements 
Most jurisdictions today require a plaintiff asserting a claim of 
negligent hiring to prove (1) that the employer owed the third party 
a duty; (2) that the employee was incompetent; (3) that the 
employer knew or should have known that the employee was 
incompetent for the position; and (4) that the employer’s negligence 
was both the actual and the proximate cause of the third party’s 
injury.52 In addition, it is necessary to show that an employment 
 47. See, e.g., Malloy v. O’Neil, 69 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1954); Or v. Edwards, 818 N.E.2d 
163 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (finding a landlord liable for rape and murder of child by 
employee). 
 48. See, e.g., Fleming v. Bronfin, Inc. 80 A.2d 915 (D.C. 1951) (finding employer liable 
for attacks made by employee delivering groceries to apartment); Hare v. Cole, 25 S.W.3d 617 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (permitting a claim against pizza delivery business for wreck caused by 
driver). 
 49. See Broderick v. King’s Way Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d 1211, 1221 n.25 
(Alaska 1991) (rejecting as “without merit” the argument that the negligent hiring doctrine 
does not require screening of an unpaid volunteer); Big Brother/Big Sister, Inc. v. Terrell, 359 
S.E.2d 241, 243 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (observing negligent hiring principles by noting that 
plaintiffs must prove that the defendant knew or should have known of a volunteer’s criminal 
propensities before the defendant could be found liable for negligent selection). But see Golden 
Spread Council, Inc. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Tex. 1996) (finding that the negligent 
hiring doctrine did not apply to impose a duty on the Boy Scouts of America or its local 
council to screen a volunteer scoutmaster because the council did not hire the volunteer). 
 50. See Negligent Hiring and Retention, supra note 4, § 1. 
 51. Cindy M. Haerle, Minnesota Developments, Employer Liability for the Criminal Acts 
of Employees Under Negligent Hiring Theory: Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 68 MINN. L. 
REV. 1303, 1307–08 (1984). 
 52. See Barbara A. O’Connell, Hiring and Interviewing in EMP. L. E-DESK REFERENCE, 
ch. 32 (2004). O’Connell explained, 
In order to prove that a cause of action for negligent hiring exists, a plaintiff is 
usually required to prove the following: the existence of an employment 
relationship; the employee’s incompetence; the employer’s actual or constructive 
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relationship exists.53 This last element will be discussed in the next 
Section in the context of volunteers as employees while addressing 
the issues surrounding employer control of volunteers. The 
following discussion briefly describes each of the first four elements. 
1. The employer’s duty 
One legal writer explained, “[T]he connection between the 
employment relationship in question and the plaintiff is the critical 
fact upon which a defendant employer’s duty is based in a negligent 
hiring or negligent retention case.”54 In addition, the duty of an 
employer is greater when employees deal with children in some 
capacity.55 Generally, three elements are common to a court’s finding 
that an employer had a duty to use due care in hiring employees on 
its behalf.56 First, at the time of the tortious action, both the 
offending employee and plaintiff were in places where each rightfully 
could be.57 Second, the offending employee and plaintiff met “as a 
direct result of the employment.”58 Third, “the employer would 
receive [or did receive] some benefit, even if only a potential or 
indirect benefit, from the meeting and the plaintiff had the wrongful 
act not occurred.”59
When the above three elements are satisfied, an employer owes a 
duty to exercise reasonable care in employing individuals who may 
pose a threat of injury to their customers and employees specifically, 
knowledge of such incompetence; the employee’s act or omission caused the 
plaintiffs injuries; and the employer’s negligence in hiring or retaining the employee 
was the proximate cause of the injury. Many states require additionally that a 
“special relationship” exist between the injured party and the employer before any 
liability for negligent hiring may attach. 
Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Negligent Hiring and Retention, supra note 4, § 6. Duty, as explained by Prosser, is 
a court’s “expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to 
say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.” PROSSER, supra note 35, at 325–26. 
 55. See, e.g., Machin v. Walgreen Co., 835 So. 2d 284, 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) 
(“Persons chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward children must take the 
precautions which are available to them.”). 
 56. North, supra note 6, at 724. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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and to the community generally.60 As part of this duty, some courts 
have imputed to employers an additional obligation to investigate an 
applicant’s background.61 Importantly, the nature of the employer’s 
duty to investigate an applicant’s background depends largely “on 
the position for which an employee is being hired and the likelihood 
that the work will subject third persons to risk of great harm.”62 
Consequently, if the employer is aware that the applicant may be 
unfit or if the offered employment is sensitive in nature and involves 
the “health, safety, and welfare” of another party, the duty of the 
employer to investigate is greater.63
In the case of organizations retaining volunteers to work with 
children, the question of duty is a balancing act between the welfare 
of children and the concomitant costs of an increased duty for 
nonprofit organizations operating with already scarce resources.64 
Especially important in this balancing act is the vulnerability of 
children. Courts in most jurisdictions have held that children are 
entitled to a greater degree of care.65 As explained by Jean Baldwin 
 60. Rodolfo A. Camacho, How To Avoid Negligent Hiring Litigation, 14 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 787, 796 (quoting Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983)). 
 61. See, e.g., Kendall v. Gore Props, Inc., 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. 1956); Weiss v. Furniture 
in the Raw, 306 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969); Robertson v. Church of God Int’l, 978 
S.W.2d 120, 125 (Tex. App. 1997) (“One who retains the services of another has a duty to 
investigate the background of that individual for fitness for the position . . . .”). 
 62. Negligent Hiring and Retention, supra note 4, § 6.  
 63. Camacho, supra note 60, at 796. To determine if the imposition of a duty in a given 
set of circumstances is justified, courts look to “the guidance of history, our continually refined 
concepts of morals and justice, the convenience of the rule, and social judgment as to where 
the loss should fall.” PROSSER, supra note 35, at 325–26. Other factors include the risk 
involved, the foreseeability of the risk, and the likelihood of the injury. Doe v. Boys Club of 
Greater Dallas, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 942, 948 (Tex. App. 1994). As explained by the Texas Court 
of Appeals, “These factors are then weighed against the social utility of the actor’s conduct and 
the magnitude of the burden on the defendant.” Id. (citing Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. 
Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990)). 
 64. See generally Lear, supra note 14, at 172–80. 
 65. See, e.g., Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000) (“Generally, a greater degree of care is owed to children because of their lack of capacity 
to appreciate risks and avoid danger.”); Machin v. Walgreen Co., 835 So. 2d 284, 284 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“Persons chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward children 
must take the precautions which are available to them.”); Atlanta Affordable Hous. Fund Ltd. 
P’ship v. Brown, 588 S.E.2d 827, 833 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (“Children of tender years and 
youthful persons generally are entitled to care proportioned to their inability to foresee and 
avoid the perils that they may encounter, as well as to the superior knowledge of persons who 
come into contact with them.”); Cook v. Smith, 33 S.W.3d 548, 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) 
(“Ordinary care may require more vigilance and caution when a child is involved if there is a 
potentially dangerous situation of which a supervisor is or should be aware.” (quoting Rogger 
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Grossman and Kathryn Furano, when selecting volunteers, “the 
safety of those receiving services must be taken into account. This is 
especially true for volunteers who work with vulnerable populations 
such as children, the mentally retarded, and the fragile elderly.”66
2. Employee’s incompetence 
The ways in which an employee may be incompetent are limited 
only by the imagination of the employee.67 For example, courts have 
found incompetency due to “habitual drinking of liquors; habitual 
carelessness, forgetfulness, inattentiveness, inexperience, a physical or 
mental defect; or a propensity for horseplay, recklessness, 
maliciousness, or viciousness.”68 More specifically, employees are 
incompetent when they possess qualities and/or characteristics that a 
reasonable employer would recognize while hiring an employee as 
qualities and/or characteristics that would likely result in injury to 
someone whom the employer has a duty to protect.69
Importantly, incompetence in this context is not limited to the 
ability of the applicant or employee to perform the tasks of his 
employment. Even the most gifted mathematician with multiple 
graduate degrees in accounting would be incompetent to work for 
an accounting firm that audited outside companies onsite if he was a 
danger to those with whom he would have contact. Incompetence 
extends to the reliability of the employee and “all that is essential to 
make up a ‘reasonably’ safe person, considering the nature of the 
work and the general safety of those who are required to associate 
with such person in the general employment.”70
v. Voyles, 797 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990))); Gloria X v. Gibbs, 659 N.Y.S.2d 349, 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (“The standard of care thereby owed to this child is indisputably higher 
than that which would be required for the care of an adult.”); Peyer v. Ohio Water Serv. Co., 
720 N.E.2d 195, 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (citing Di Gildo v. Caponi, 247 N.E.2d 732, 
733–34 (Ohio 1969)). 
 66. See Grossman & Furano, supra note 13, at 199. One example of this principle is the 
Ohio Court of Appeals decision in Peyer v. Ohio Water Service Co., 720 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1998). In Peyer, the Court said, “[C]hildren are entitled to a higher degree of care than 
adults and . . . the amount of care required to discharge a duty to a child is greater than that 
required to discharge a similar duty owed to an adult.” Id. at 200. 
 67. See Donald K. Armstrong, Comment, Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment: 
The Case Against Exclusion, 52 OR. L. REV. 296, 298 (1973). 
 68. Id. at 99 (footnotes omitted). 
 69. Negligent Hiring and Retention, supra note 4, § 8.  
 70. Id. (citing 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 310). 
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For example, the Florida Court of Appeals held that a furniture 
company negligently hired a furniture deliveryman because the 
furniture company failed to require the deliveryman to fill out an 
application or to ask any questions about his background even 
though the employee’s duties would require him to enter customers’ 
private homes.71 If the furniture company had investigated the 
employee, it likely would have discovered that the employee had an 
extensive juvenile and criminal record, had been diagnosed with 
paranoid schizophrenia, and had used drugs and alcohol heavily.72 
However, because it did not investigate the employee prior to hiring 
and retaining him, the employee was permitted to enter into the 
home of a customer where he caused extensive personal injuries to 
that customer.73 While the employee was likely completely able to 
perform the job, his background manifested that he was incompetent 
to perform the job where he might endanger others. Given the 
nature of the employment—entering into the homes of customers—
the employer should have taken reasonable steps to assure itself of 
the competence of the employee. Thus, an employee’s competence 
in the negligent hiring context includes not only the employee’s 
ability to perform the employment but also whether the employee is 
a reasonably safe person given the nature of the work. 
3. Employer’s knowledge of employee’s incompetence 
After establishing an employer’s duty and the employee’s 
incompetence, the plaintiff must prove that the employer had actual 
or constructive knowledge of an employee’s incompetence.74 To 
prove constructive knowledge in this situation, if a plaintiff 
demonstrates 
that an employer hired or retained an employee that it knew or, in 
the exercise of reasonable care, should have known was 
incompetent for the job position assigned, then the employer may 
 71. Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
 72. Id. at 749. 
 73. Id. at 747. 
 74. Camacho, supra note 60, at 802; see, e.g., Total Rehab. & Med. Ctrs., Inc. v. 
E.B.O., 915 So. 2d 694, 696 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Watson v. Hialeah, 552 
So. 2d 1146, 1148 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)); Evans v. Ohio State Univ., 680 N.E.2d 
161, 171 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
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be liable for any injury to the plaintiff caused by the employee’s 
incompetence.75
A plaintiff establishes an employer’s actual knowledge of an 
employee’s incompetence by demonstrating that the employer either 
possessed evidence of the incompetence or had witnessed evidence of 
such.76 Of course, a plaintiff need not prove that the employer had 
actual knowledge of an employee’s incompetence;77 the employer 
will be equally liable if the plaintiff can show that the employer had 
constructive knowledge of the employee’s incompetence.78 A plaintiff 
demonstrates constructive knowledge on the part of the employer 
where “information indicating that the employee was incompetent 
was available to the employer and that the employer would have 
known of this information had it exercised reasonable care in hiring 
or retaining the incompetent employee.”79
The furniture company in the previous section provides an 
excellent example of a defendant held to have had constructive 
knowledge of an employee’s incompetence.80 In that case, the court 
held that if the furniture company had investigated the applicant for 
the deliveryman position, it likely would have discovered that the 
employee had an extensive juvenile and criminal record, had been 
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, and had used drugs and 
alcohol heavily.81 Thus, where an investigation would have revealed a 
potential employee’s incompetence, an employer’s lack of actual 
knowledge concerning the incompetence does not relieve it of 
liability.82
4. Causation and proximate cause 
As in other causes of action based upon a party’s negligence, 
plaintiffs asserting the tort of negligent hiring must prove that their 
injuries were “actually and proximately caused” by the employer’s 
 75. Negligent Hiring and Retention, supra note 4, § 9. 
 76. Camacho, supra note 60, at 803. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Negligent Hiring and Retention, supra note 4, § 9. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1991). 
 81. Id. at 749. 
 82. Id. 
6FIFE.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006  11:44:05 AM 
569] Negligent Hiring and Volunteers in Religious Organizations 
 585 
 
failure to exercise reasonable care in hiring.83 In other words, 
plaintiffs must demonstrate that their injuries resulted as a logical 
consequence of an employee’s incompetence that was actually or 
constructively known to the employer.84
The principles of causation and proximate cause in the context of 
negligent hiring are set forth in the following examples that 
demonstrate the need for a relationship between the employee’s 
incompetence and the tortious conduct resulting in the plaintiff’s 
injuries. 
1. D employs A as a maintenance employee. D knows that A has 
two prior convictions for assault and battery, that he is a heavy 
drinker and that he is frequently in trouble. D sends A to P’s 
apartment to fix an appliance. While in P’s apartment, A assaults 
and beats P causing serious injuries. 
2. D employs A as a maintenance employee. D knows that A has a 
prior conviction for embezzlement but has no other negative 
aspects in his character or background. A becomes a model 
employee for D. One day, D sends A to P’s apartment to fix an 
appliance. A fixes the appliances and sexually assaults P.85
It is clear in the first example that a casual link exists because P’s 
injuries resulted from those attributes that would render A 
incompetent to work in the apartment complex: A’s convictions for 
assault and battery, his heavy drinking, and his proclivity for 
trouble.86 However, in the second example, given that A’s prior 
conviction was for embezzlement, it is much more difficult to 
establish a causal link between A’s attributes and the sexual assault. 
While previous crimes of any sort may serve as an indicator of 
potential criminal activity, A’s attributes in the second example are 
too attenuated for proximate cause to exist.87
The facts in Strickland v. Communications and Cable of Chicago, 
Inc.88 demonstrate the lack of causal link. In Strickland, the court 
held that a cable company’s failure to perform a prehiring 
 83. Camacho, supra note 60, at 802. 
 84. Negligent Hiring and Retention, supra note 4, § 10 (citing Bensman v. Reed, 20 
N.E.2d 910 (Ill. App. Ct. 1939); Halsan v. Johnson, 65 P.2d 661 (Or. 1937)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. 710 N.E.2d 55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
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investigation of a cable installer’s background was not the proximate 
cause of a customer’s injuries from the installer’s sexual assault on 
the customer.89 The court explained that the failure to examine was 
not the proximate cause because an investigation would have 
revealed only that the installer tended to commit traffic infractions 
and that the installer had lied about those infractions on the 
applications.90 Because the investigation would not have revealed any 
information that would have even hinted to the employer that the 
installer would commit sexual assault, no causal link could exist 
between the plaintiff’s injuries and the employer’s failure to 
investigate the employee’s background.91 It is generally not enough 
that the potential act is conceivable; rather, a plaintiff must allege 
facts that show the injuries were foreseeable.92
In summary, plaintiffs asserting a claim of negligent hiring must 
prove (1) that the employer owed the third party a duty, (2) that the 
employee was incompetent, (3) that the employer knew or should 
have known that the employee was incompetent for the position, and 
(4) that the employer’s negligence was both the actual and the 
proximate cause of the third party’s injury.93 Also, as explained 
above, plaintiffs must demonstrate that an employment relationship 
existed between the employer and the party that caused the plaintiff’s 
injuries, a finding that is especially significant in the context of 
volunteers. 
 89. Id. at 59; see also Giraldi v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 62, 665 N.E.2d 332 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1996). In Giraldi, the Plaintiff sued the bus company and the school district for 
negligently hiring the bus driver after the bus driver sexually molested the Plaintiff on a bus. 
Id. at 334–35. The driver had a history of arriving late to work. Id. at 335. The trial court 
refused to submit the negligent hiring count to the jury. Id. On appeal, the appellate court 
affirmed the trial court’s refusal to submit the negligent hiring claim to the jury, holding that 
the only conduct the bus company could have been warned of, had it investigated the driver’s 
past conduct, was a tendency to be late. Id. at 341. The court concluded that there was no 
factual or logical relationship between that knowledge and the attack on plaintiff. Id. 
 90. Strickland, 710 N.E.2d at 58. 
 91. See also Island City Flying Serv. v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 585 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 
1991) (finding that an employee’s tardiness, missing work, and allowing persons to ride on 
refueling truck did not make it foreseeable that employee would steal and crash plane); Ford v. 
Gildin, 613 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (finding that the landlord could not 
anticipate that doorman and tenants would form close relationship in which doorman became 
godfather of tenants’ child, and later molested the child in his own personal time). 
 92. See, e.g., Chaney v. Super. Ct., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
 93. See O’Connell, supra note 52. 
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IV. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CASES OF VOLUNTEERS 
AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS 
When applied to volunteers and to religious institutions, 
additional considerations are pertinent to the negligent hiring 
examination. For example, where organizations use volunteers, a 
court must determine whether the organization exercised sufficient 
control over the volunteer to merit the application of the tort of 
negligent hiring for tortious actions on the part of the volunteer.94 
Furthermore, in the case of religious institutions, attempts by a court 
to apply the tort of negligent hiring naturally implicate the First 
Amendment.95 This Part examines the tort of negligent hiring in the 
context of volunteers and finds that the employer must control the 
volunteer for an employment relationship to exist. In addition, it 
examines the tort of negligent hiring as applied to religious 
institutions and identifies the First Amendment questions that arise, 
including a split in authority concerning application of the tort of 
negligent hiring to religious institutions. 
A. Control and the Existence of an Employment Relationship 
Volunteers fill an essential role within American civil society and 
provide important services, especially to nonprofit organizations.96 
During the course of one year, more than ninety million Americans 
will give in excess of twenty billion hours of their personal time to 
schools, churches, nonprofit organizations, and to the community in 
general.97 Nonprofit organizations are increasingly dependent upon 
volunteers for delivering services to the communities in which they 
are located.98 However, in spite of the gratuitous manner in which 
 94. See Broderick v. King’s Way Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d 1211, 1221 n.25 
(Alaska 1991) (rejecting as “without merit” the argument that the negligent hiring doctrine 
does not require screening of an unpaid volunteer). Whether an employment relationship 
existed is an element of the negligent hiring action, but it takes on special significance in a 
volunteer situation given that a traditional employment relationship with consideration does 
not usually exist. 
 95. See, e.g., Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (D. Colo. 1998); Gibson v. Brewer, 
952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997). 
 96. See Grossman & Furano, supra note 13, at 199. 
 97. Id. See generally LINDA JUCOVY & KATHRYN FURANO, PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
VENTURES: UNITING THE EFFORTS OF VOLUNTEERS AND PAID SERVICE PROVIDERS: 
CURRENT PRACTICES FROM THE FIELD (1998). 
 98. Grossman & Furano, supra note 13, at 199 (“These volunteers serve on nonprofit 
boards, sing in their church choirs, participate in neighborhood clean-ups, deliver meals to the 
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volunteers render service, organizations may still be liable for 
untoward actions committed by volunteers.99 Indeed, where 
organizations exercise rights of control over volunteers similar to 
those rights of control associated with traditional employment, a 
court will treat a volunteer as an employee for liability purposes. 
1. Volunteers as employees and the question of control 
While an employment relationship is essential for any finding of 
negligent hiring,100 it takes on special significance where volunteers 
are involved because the right to control in a volunteer situation 
often varies from a traditional employment relationship.101 For the 
most part, courts have treated volunteers as employees of the 
organizations for whom they are engaged.102 This principle is 
embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which states, “One 
who volunteers services without an agreement for or expectation of 
reward may be a servant of the one accepting such services.”103 
Furthermore, the comment to this section adds, 
elderly, and provide countless other services. Without this donated labor, organizations 
dependent on volunteers would not reach nearly the number of people or provide the level of 
service they do.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Evans v. Ohio State Univ., 680 N.E.2d 161 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
 100. See O’Connell, supra note 52 (listing elements of negligent hiring cause of action, 
including “the existence of an employment relationship”). The Colorado Supreme Court 
explained, “It is axiomatic that a prerequisite to establishing negligent hiring is an employment 
or agency relationship.” Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 324 (Colo. 1993) (citing 
Stortroen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 736 P.2d 391 (Colo. 1987)); see also Philip M. Berkowitz, 
Challenges of Workplace Safety and Security, 681 PRAC. L. INST./LIT. 219, 249 (Sept. 2002) 
(“The existence of an employment relationship is a fundamental requirement of a claim for 
negligent hiring or retention. Under Maine law, the test for determining the existence of an 
employment relationship is whether the employer has a right to control the employee.”). 
 101. Given the need for the existence of an employment relationship in establishing 
negligent hiring, control theoretically would be an essential finding in any case. However, it is 
usually not considered where a traditional employment (master-servant) relationship exists. 
Rather, it is assumed that the proper amount of control exists. The real significance of an 
employment relationship arises in the volunteer setting because of the varying degrees of 
control an organization may exercise over a volunteer. 
 102. See Broderick v. King’s Way Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d 1211, 1221 n.25 
(Alaska 1991); Big Brother/Big Sister, Inc. v. Terrell, 359 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1987). But see Golden Spread Council, Inc. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Tex. 1996). 
 103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 225 (1958) (internal citations omitted). 
See also id. § 213, which states that a “person conducting an activity through servants or other 
agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or 
reckless: . . . in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work involving risk 
of harm to others.” 
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Consideration is not necessary to create the relation of principal 
and agent, and it is not necessary in the case of master and servant. 
One who has no contractual capacity may be a servant, or a master. 
One may be a servant without having promised to give or to 
continue the service.104
Thus, the organization utilizing volunteer services will generally 
be liable for negligent hiring if the organization can exercise control 
over the volunteer.105 This principle is demonstrated in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which further emphasizes the necessity 
of the element of control in determining whether the tort of 
negligent hiring has occurred.106 It explains that 
[i]t is negligence to permit a third person . . . to engage in an 
activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or 
should know that such person intends . . . to conduct himself in the 
activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm 
to others.107
Many states have emphasized control as a factor in determining 
whether a volunteer is an employee in the negligent hiring context 
similar to the above statements by the Restatement. For example, the 
Colorado Supreme Court explained that the “right to control” is the 
key factor in deciding whether the organization can be liable for the 
actions of a volunteer.108 In addition, the Ohio Court of Appeals 
held in Evans v. Ohio State University, “The determination of 
whether an unpaid volunteer is a servant ‘generally depends on the 
charitable organization’s right to control the activities of the 
volunteer.’”109
Some states have even developed specific criteria to determine 
whether an organization controls a volunteer in such a way that the 
 104. Id. § 225 cmt. a. 
 105. Evans v. Ohio State Univ., 680 N.E.2d 161, 174 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (citing Doe 
v. Roman Catholic Church, 602 So. 2d 129 (La. Ct. App. 1992)). 
 106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965). 
 107. Id. (emphasis added). 
 108. Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 324 (Colo. 1993) (“The most important 
factor in determining whether a person is an agent is ‘the right to control, not the fact of 
control.’” (quoting Dana’s Housekeeping v. Butterfield, 807 P.2d 1218, 1210 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1990))). 
 109. Evans, 680 N.E.2d at 174 (citing Roman Catholic Church, 602 So. 2d at 133). 
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volunteer is an employee for liability purposes.110 Specifically, Texas 
courts look to four criteria to determine whether an organization has 
control over volunteers for liability purposes, namely, “whether the 
employer: 1. [h]as a right to direct the duties of the volunteer; 2. 
[h]as an interest in the work to be accomplished; 3. [a]ccepts direct 
or incidental benefit derived from the volunteer’s work; and 4. [h]as 
a right to fire or replace the volunteer.”111
In contrast with other right-to-control tests, the Texas test does 
not occupy itself with mode of payment, questions concerning profit, 
or other factors not necessary for control over a volunteer.112 
Furthermore, the Texas test succinctly provides a framework through 
which an examination can be made while still accurately 
demonstrating whether the employer possessed the right to control 
the volunteer.113 Once a court does determine that an employer 
possesses the right to control a volunteer, then the employer may be 
 110. The Texas test set forth in Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 942, 
950 (Tex. App. 1994) (citing Smith v. Univ. of Texas, 664 S.W.2d 180, 190 (Tex. App. 
1984)) is primarily used in this Comment on account of its applicability to volunteers and the 
ease with which it is applied to the facts of the Montoya case. In contrast with other tests, the 
Texas test does not preoccupy itself with mode of payment, questions concerning profit, or 
other factors not necessary for control over a volunteer. Id. While Utah law would be 
controlling in the case of Montoya, Utah has not clearly spelled out the factors of its right to 
control test in either its negligent hiring or respondeat superior cases. See Glover ex rel. Dyson 
v. Boy Scouts of Am., 923 P.2d 1383, 1385–86 (Utah 1996). Furthermore, the Texas test 
succinctly provides a framework through which an examination can be made while still 
accurately demonstrating whether the employer possessed the right to control the volunteer. 
 111. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, 868 S.W.2d at 950 (citing Smith 664 S.W.2d at190). 
 112. Other “right to control” tests exist throughout the states. However, in contrast with 
the Texas test, several of the factors are irrelevant in the volunteer context. For example, in 
Indiana the test for determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists consists of 
seven factors: “(1) the right to discharge; (2) mode of payment; (3) supplying tools or 
equipment; (4) belief by the parties in the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (5) 
control over the means used in the results reached; (6) length of employment; and (7) 
establishment of the work boundaries.” Southport Little League v. Vaughn, 734 N.E.2d 261, 
268 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (determining employment relationship in respondeat superior 
matter). The Colorado test consists of the following six factors: (1) the degree of control over 
the manner in which the work is performed; (2) the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss 
depending on his managerial skill; (3) the worker’s investment in equipment or materials, or 
his employment of helpers; (4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; (5) the 
degree of permanence of the working relationship; and (6) whether the service rendered is an 
integral part of the employer’s business. John R. Paddock, Jr., Employer Liability to Third 
Parties, 16 COLO. PRAC., EMP. L. & PRAC. § 14.2 (2d ed.). The federal right to control test 
for independent contractors consists of ten factors, while the IRS has twenty factors it uses to 
determine control. Myra H. Barron, Who’s an Independent Contractor? Who’s an Employee?, 14 
LAB. LAW. 457, 459–62 (1999). 
 113. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, 868 S.W.2d at 950. 
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liable for its volunteer’s tortious actions regardless of whether the 
employer pays the volunteer or not. 
B. Applying Negligent Hiring to Religious Institutions 
In the wake of the decline of charitable immunity114 and an 
increased willingness on the part of parishioners to bring suit against 
religious institutions for the inappropriate actions of clergy and 
employees,115 there is an ever-increasing number of tort actions 
against churches and other religious organizations that are based on 
claims of negligent hiring.116 While actions based upon respondeat 
superior seldom survive a motion to dismiss in third party claims 
against religious institutions for misconduct on the part of their 
servants, churches are increasingly found liable for negligent 
hiring.117 However, “tort claims based on a religious institution’s 
negligent hiring . . . of a member of its clergy are highly contentious 
because the inquiry requires a court to evaluate the reasonableness of 
a Church’s employment decisions,”118 raising several First 
Amendment concerns. For those reasons, splits exist among both 
state and federal courts concerning whether the First Amendment 
bars negligent hiring suits against religious institutions.119
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting the 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”120 
 114. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 9, at 1797–805. 
 115. See Lisa J. Kelty, Note, Malicki v. Doe: The Constitutionality of Negligent Hiring 
and Supervision Claims, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (2004). For a short history of sexual 
molestation cases against clergy, see Michael F. Aylward, Constitution, Crime, Clergy: First 
Amendment Implications of Sexual Abuse Claims, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 196, 196–97 (Apr. 
2003). 
 116. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Liability of Church or Religious Organization 
for Negligent Hiring, Retention, or Supervision of Priest, Minister, or Other Clergy Based on 
Sexual Misconduct, 101 A.L.R. 5th 1, 1 (2002). 
 117. Janna Satz Nugent, A Higher Authority: The Viability of Third Party Tort Actions 
Against a Religious Institution Grounded on Sexual Misconduct by a Member of the Clergy, 30 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 957, 969 (2003). 
 118. Id. at 971. 
 119. See Berry v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc. of N.Y., Inc., 879 A.2d 1124, 1135 
(N.H. 2005) (speaking of breach of fiduciary duty, common law negligence, negligent 
supervision and hiring, and negligent counseling); see also Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 
357–58 (Fla. 2002) (summarizing litigation across the country); Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1256–62 (Miss. 2005) (listing federal and state court 
decisions on either side of the issue). 
 120. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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As a matter of practical application, “[t]he First Amendment ‘permits 
hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and 
regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create 
tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters.’”121 In 
addition, “[t]he assessment of an individual’s fitness to serve as a 
priest is a particular ecclesiastical matter entitled to this constitutional 
protection.”122 If a court becomes involved in or is called upon to 
examine a religious institution’s discipline of its clergy, then that 
examination implicates the First Amendment.123
While the First Amendment is implicated by a court of law’s 
examination of a religious institution, it does not provide a defense 
to child abuse or other crimes.124 However, it does “clearly bar[] 
government from involving itself in purely ecclesiastic matters, 
including, but not limited to church doctrine, hiring, firing and 
retention of church employees and or ministers.”125 Accordingly, the 
First Amendment may serve as a defense to negligent hiring on the 
part of ecclesiastical leaders that fail to dismiss clergy or to reassign 
them without proper supervision or discipline.126
It is, however, important to note that difficulty arises in the 
actual application of the First Amendment to questions of negligent 
hiring in the ecclesiastical arena given the split in authority that exists 
both among state127 and federal courts.128 Some courts that have 
 121. Aylward, supra note 115, at 197 (quoting Wheeler v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese 
of Boston, 389 N.E.2d 966, 968 (Mass. 1979). 
 122. Id. (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)). 
 123. Id. at 197–98 (citing Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 
1577 (1st Cir. 1988); Dowd v. Soc’y of St. Columbans, 861 F.2d. 761, 763 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
 124. Id. at 198. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Authority exists in the following states supporting the conclusion that the First 
Amendment is not a bar to civil litigation in cases involving religious institutions: California, 
Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego v. Super. Ct., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996); Colorado, Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988); Connecticut, Rosado v. 
Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 716 A.2d 967 (Conn. 1998); Florida, Doe v. 
Evans, 814 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2002); Illinois, Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446 (Ill. 1997); 
Indiana, Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Minnesota, Odenthal v. 
Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 2002); New Jersey, 
F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997); New York, Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic 
Diocese, 229 A.2d 159 (N.Y. 1997); North Carolina, Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395 (N.C. 
1998); Ohio, Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Oregon, Erickson v. Christenson, 
781 P.2d 383 (Or. 1989); Texas, Martinez v. Primera Asemblea de Dios, Inc., No. 05-96-
01458-CV, 1998 WL 242412 (Tex. App. 1998); Washington, C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic 
6FIFE.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006  11:44:05 AM 
569] Negligent Hiring and Volunteers in Religious Organizations 
 593 
 
disallowed actions against religious institutions based on negligent 
hiring have held that that the First Amendment bars a claim of 
negligent hiring because the inquiry “might involve the Court in 
making sensitive judgments about the propriety of the church 
Defendants’ supervision in light of their religious beliefs.”129 In 
addition, the courts have found that “imposing a secular duty of 
supervision on the church and enforcing that duty through civil 
liability would restrict its freedom to interact with its clergy.”130
On the other hand, some courts that have permitted negligent 
hiring actions against religious institutions have found that the First 
Amendment does not bar a negligent supervision claim because the 
court’s analysis would “not require interpreting or weighing church 
doctrine and neutral principles of law can be applied.”131 Such 
decisions are often based on the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Bishop of Yakima, 985 P.2d 262 (Wash. 1999). In contrast, authority exists in the following 
states supporting the conclusion that the First Amendment is a bar to civil litigation in cases 
involving religious institutions: Louisiana, Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 
1994); Maine, Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 738 A.2d 839 (Me. 
1999); Michigan, Teadt v. Lutheran Church Mo. Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. 1999); 
Minnesota, Mulinix v. Mulinix, No. C2-97-297, 1997 WL 585775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); 
Missouri, Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997); Rhode Island, Heroux v. 
Carpentier, No. C.A. PC 92-5807, 1998 WL 388298 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1998); Washington, 
S.H.C. v. Sheng-Yen-Lu, 54 P.3d 174 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002); Wisconsin, L.L.N. v. Clauder, 
563 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1997). 
 128. Nugent, supra note 117, at 971–72. Authority exists in the following federal 
jurisdictions supporting the conclusion that the First Amendment is not a bar to civil litigation 
in cases involving religious institutions: Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan 
Corp., 196 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 1999); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 
F. Supp. 2d 139 (D. Conn. 2003); Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73 (D.R.I. 1997); Doe 
v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1431–32 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 134 
F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998); Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. 
Tex. 1995). In contrast, authority exists in the following federal jurisdictions supporting the 
conclusion that the First Amendment is a bar to civil litigation in cases involving religious 
institutions: Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994); Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-
Missouri Synod, 269 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 
1246 (D. Colo. 1998); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich 1995); 
Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 129. Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 332, cited in Nugent, supra note 117, at 971–72 n.83; see 
also Isely, 880 F. Supp. 1138; Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997); Wende C. v. 
United Methodist Church, 776 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Kenneth R., 654 
N.Y.S.2d 791. 
 130. Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 445 (Me. 1997), 
cited in Nugent, supra note 117, at 971–72 n.83. 
 131. Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 321 (Colo. 1993); see also Doe v. Hartz, 
970 F. Supp. 1375, 1431–32 (N.D. Iowa 1997), cited in Nugent, supra note 117, at 971–72 
n.83; Isely, 880 F. Supp. at 1151. 
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Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,132 
and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.133 In 
the case of the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the Supreme Court 
explained that “a law that is neutral and of general applicability need 
not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law 
has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious 
practice.”134 Therefore, courts that have permitted an action for 
negligent hiring to proceed in spite of the First Amendment have 
done so based upon the argument that the courts were merely 
applying neutral principles of tort law.135 While the above discussion 
addresses both Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause 
considerations, the following subsections will provide additional 
considerations for the respective clauses. 
1. The Establishment Clause 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman is the 
“current guidance for application of the Establishment Clause to 
claims of governmental intrusion into religious territory.”136 As the 
Supreme Court explained in Lemon, the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment serves to guard against three evils: “sponsorship, 
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious 
activity.”137 In Lemon, the Court said that government action is 
constitutional under the Establishment Clause if it satisfies the 
following three requirements: (1) it has a secular purpose, (2) its 
primary effect is neither to enhance nor inhibit religion, and (3) the 
action does not foster an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.138
The third and final prong, excessive entanglement, has played an 
important role in negligent hiring cases.139 To determine if excessive 
 132. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 133. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 134. Id. at 531. 
 135. See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 365 (Fla. 2002). 
 136. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1225 (Miss. 
2005). 
 137. Kelty, supra note 115, at 1127 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 
(1971)). The following summary of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses is taken 
primarily from Kelty’s Note. 
 138. Id. (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–613). 
 139. See, e.g., Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1150–51 (E.D. Mich. 
1995) (holding that assuming a cause of action for negligent hiring existed in a priest abuse 
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entanglement exists, a court “examine[s] the character and purposes 
of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the 
state provides, and the resulting relationship between the 
government and the religious authority.”140 Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted excessive entanglement to mean that 
“routine regulatory interaction that involves no inquiries into 
religious doctrine, no delegation of state power to a religious body, 
and no ‘detailed monitoring and close administrative contact’ 
between secular and religious bodies, [will] not itself violate the 
nonentanglement command.”141 Therefore, “if the inverse of any of 
the preceding three statements are true, . . . excessive entanglement 
between church and state may result.”142
2. The Free Exercise Clause 
The Free Exercise Clause, in contrast with the Establishment 
Clause, “guarantees ‘first and foremost, the right to believe and 
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.’”143 Among its 
functions, the Free Exercise Clause shelters individuals “against laws 
that discriminate based on religious beliefs, as well as ordinances that 
regulate or prohibit conduct undertaken for religious reasons.”144 
This shelter from government regulation, however, is not an 
absolute protection from all regulation. The Supreme Court, to 
ensure that governments still have some power to regulate, has 
explained that regulation and infringement are not synonymous; 
however, “any attempt to infringe on the free exercise of religion, 
beyond mere regulations to keep peace and order in society, must be 
justified by a compelling state interest.”145
When determining whether conduct is constitutionally protected 
under the Free Exercise Clause, “the first inquiry . . . is whether the 
case, inquiry into church decisions regarding who should be permitted to become a priest 
would have involved excessive entanglement with religion). 
 140. Kelty, supra note 115, at 1127 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615). 
 141. Id. at 1128 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 696–97 (1989)). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1130 (quoting Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 354 (Fla. 2002)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1131 (citing Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Supreme Court Cases Involving 
Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of Federal Constitution, 37 L. Ed. 2d 1147, 
1158 (1999)). 
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conduct being regulated ‘is rooted in religious belief.’”146 If the 
court determines that the conduct is rooted in religious belief, then 
it must determine whether the law “regulating the religious belief is 
neutral ‘both on its face and in its purpose.’”147 If the court then 
determines that the primary purpose of a law is to infringe upon or 
restrict practices on account of the practices’ religious motivation, 
the law is not neutral, and it is valid only if justified by a compelling 
interest narrowly tailored to advance that interest.148 However, if the 
court determines that the law is “a neutral law of general applicability 
[that] only incidentally burdens religious practices,” then the 
government need not justify it by a compelling interest.149
C. Conclusion 
As has been demonstrated, when the tort of negligent hiring 
occurs where an organization is employing a volunteer or where the 
organization is a religious institution, the court is forced to make 
additional considerations. In the context of applying the tort of 
negligent hiring to an organization utilizing volunteers, the 
plaintiff’s burden of establishing an employment relationship 
becomes much more pertinent than in cases involving traditional 
employment relationships. However, where the organization has a 
right to control the volunteer, an employment relationship exists for 
purposes of the tort. 
Furthermore, the First Amendment is implicated where a plaintiff 
brings suit against a religious institution for the tort of negligent 
hiring. And as explained above, a split in authority currently exists 
with regards to the constitutionality of applying the principles of 
negligent hiring to decisions and practices of churches. Both the 
First Amendment considerations and the additional examination 
necessary for volunteers complicate the application of the tort of 
negligent hiring to religious institutions employing volunteers, such 
as the LDS Church. 
 146. Id. (quoting Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 354). 
 147. Id. (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
531 (1993)). 
 148. Id. (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 533). 
 149. Id. (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531). 
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V. THE LDS CHURCH AND THE TORT OF NEGLIGENT HIRING 
The following applies the tort of negligent hiring to the LDS 
Church based upon the legal principles explored above. First, this 
Part will apply the elements of negligent hiring to the known facts of 
the Aaron Marcos Montoya case and general LDS Church policies 
and practices. Following the application of the tort of negligent 
hiring to the LDS Church, this Part will consider whether the First 
Amendment should bar an action based upon negligent hiring 
against the LDS Church. As a result of the discussion found herein, 
this Comment concludes that not all of the elements of the tort of 
negligent hiring were present in the LDS Church’s utilization of 
Montoya as a Primary teacher given that the LDS Church likely did 
not have either actual or constructive knowledge of his pedophilia. 
Furthermore, it concludes that even if each of the elements of the 
tort were satisfied, actions against religious institutions based on the 
tort of negligent hiring should be barred by the First Amendment 
given the excessive entanglement that would occur by a judicial 
examination of church policies and practices. 
A. Applying the Tort of Negligent Hiring 
to Volunteers in the LDS Church 
Because the LDS Church likely had neither actual nor 
constructive knowledge that Montoya was incompetent to care for 
children, not all of the elements of tort of negligent hiring are 
satisfied. As explained above, an action for negligent hiring as applied 
to volunteers in religious organizations has five elements that must 
be proven by the plaintiff: (1) the employer exercised control over 
the volunteer, (2) that the employer owed the third party a duty, (3) 
that the employee was incompetent, (4) that the employer knew or 
should have known that the employee was incompetent for the 
position, and (5) that the employee’s negligence was both the actual 
and proximate cause of the third party’s injury.150
This Section will first examine whether each of the elements of 
the tort of negligent hiring is present in the case of Aaron Marcos 
Montoya. As part of that examination, emphasis is placed on whether 
the LDS Church has a right to control its volunteers, which would 
establish an employment relationship. In addition, special attention is 
 150. See Camacho, supra note 60, at 795; O’Connell, supra note 52. 
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paid to the degree of care governing organizations caring for 
children. This Section concludes that each of the elements was likely 
present in the Montoya case except for the element requiring actual 
or constructive knowledge. 
1. The LDS Church’s control over Primary teachers 
Because of the control that the LDS Church exercises over 
Primary teachers, it is likely that a court would establish that an 
employment relationship exists between the church and its volunteer 
teachers. As explained above, a right to control, not consideration, is 
the key test for determining whether an organization will be liable 
for the conduct of its volunteers.151 The test as applied by Texas 
courts illustrates well those aspects of control especially pertinent to 
this examination.152 In contrast with other right-to-control tests, the 
Texas test does not occupy itself with mode of payment, questions 
concerning profit, or other factors not necessary for control over a 
volunteer.153 Furthermore, the Texas test succinctly provides a 
framework through which an examination can be made while still 
accurately demonstrating whether the employer possessed the right 
to control the volunteer.154 In Texas, a volunteer is an employee 
when the employer (1) has a right to direct the duties of the 
volunteer, (2) has an interest in the work to be accomplished, (3) 
accepts direct or incidental benefit derived from the volunteer’s 
work, and (4) has a right to fire or replace the volunteer.155
Under the Texas right-to-control test, an employment 
relationship likely exists between the LDS Church and volunteers 
working with children as teachers in the Primary. First of all, the 
LDS Church defines and actively directs the duties of Primary 
teachers. The church has created a specific organization and 
structure to be used in conjunction with the Primary and defined its 
purposes and objectives. The Church also writes and provides the 
 151. See supra Part IV.A; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 225 cmt. a 
(1958). 
 152. See, e.g., Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 942, 950 (Tex. App. 
1994) (citing Smith v. Univ. of Tex., 664 S.W.2d 180, 190 (Tex. App. 1984)). 
 153. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 154. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, 868 S.W.2d at 950. 
 155. Id.  
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curriculum to be taught by the Primary teachers.156 Furthermore, the 
LDS Church, where available, trains the teachers through teacher 
development courses.157
The second inquiry in the Texas control test is whether the 
employer has an interest in the work to be accomplished. In the case 
of the work provided by Primary teachers, the LDS Church most 
definitely has an interest in the work. The Primary children are not 
only the future members and leaders of the church, but are also 
viewed as precious and of great intrinsic worth.158 Primary serves as a 
means of preparing children to take the reins of the church in the 
future and insure that it continues to fulfill its missions. 
Third, the LDS Church receives both direct and incidental 
benefit from the work of Primary teachers. The work of Primary 
teachers facilitates the other meetings in which adults are involved by 
freeing parents from their parental demands. In addition, Primary 
teachers serve to inculcate in children the values and beliefs of the 
church. 
Finally, LDS Church leaders are at complete liberty to remove 
Primary teachers from their positions within the Primary. While 
church members are free to decline callings extended to them from 
leaders or to retire from a position once they have accepted it, the 
Church has an absolute right to remove or replace a member as a 
teacher in the Primary at any time. Under the Texas four-prong 
control test, the LDS Church exercises sufficient control over its 
 156. Naomi M. Shumway, Primary, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM (1992) 
available at http://www.lightplanet.com/mormons/basic/organization/Primary_EOM.htm. 
Shumway explains, 
Church leaders call and set apart lay officers and teachers to oversee the Primary; and 
Primary general officers and Church curriculum committees prepare handbooks, 
teaching guides, visual aids, lesson manuals, and a variety of training videos for their 
use. Monthly in-service lessons help teachers improve their teaching skills and relate 
appropriately to children. Periodically, the Primary general presidency and board 
members conduct multistake or regional training sessions. Leaders and teachers seek 
and receive inspiration in their Primary service. 
Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See HANDBOOK OF INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 19, at 229 (citing Mark 10:14); see 
also Matthew 18:5–6, which states, 
And whoso shall receive one such little child in my name receiveth me. But whoso 
shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a 
millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the 
sea. 
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Primary teachers to create an employer-employee relationship, which 
gives rise to a duty of care under the negligent hiring tort. 
2. Duty of the LDS Church in screening potential Primary teachers 
After establishing that a Primary teacher is indeed an employee 
for purposes of negligent hiring, a determination of liability under 
that tort requires that the employee owe a duty to the third-party 
victim. This analysis now examines the three preliminary questions 
for determining whether a duty is owed and the arguments for both 
a greater and lesser duty of care. It concludes that the LDS Church 
likely did not exercise sufficient care in inviting Montoya’s to serve as 
a Primary teacher because LDS Church leaders generally do not 
investigate the background of potential teachers. 
a. Preliminary questions. As explained above,159 prior to applying 
a duty to the volunteer organization, in this case the LDS Church, a 
court first determines whether the following three elements are 
present: (1) “the incompetent employee and plaintiff are in places 
where each [has] a right to be at the time that the plaintiff sustains 
injury”;160 (2) “the incompetent employee and the plaintiff come 
into contact as a direct result of the employment”;161 and (3) “the 
employer has received or would have received some benefit, either 
direct, indirect, or potential, from the meeting of the employee and 
the plaintiff.”162
With regard to the first element in determining whether a duty 
exists, it is likely that a court would find that Montoya and the 
individuals he molested were both in a place where they had a right 
to be at the time of the molestation. Because Montoya and his wife 
were the Primary teachers called by the LDS Church to teach the 
five-year-old class, Montoya had not only a right to be at the 
location of the molestation, but a responsibility to be there. In 
addition, each of the five-year old girls he molested had the right to 
 159. See supra Part III.A. 
 160. Negligent Hiring and Retention, supra note 4, § 6 (citing North, supra note 10, at 
720). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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be in the classroom since the LDS Church provides the rooms and 
the teachers for the benefit of the children.163
As to the second element in determining the existence of a duty, 
Montoya came into contact with his victims on account of his calling 
as a Primary teacher. In his position as a Primary teacher, Montoya 
was placed in a position of trust and care and charged with the 
education of his victims.164 The very purpose of the calling requires 
contact with the children.165 While it is possible that Montoya would 
have come in contact with his victims without the calling, his contact 
with them in this case is undeniably the result of his service in the 
Primary. 
Finally, as explained in the consideration of whether the LDS 
Church controlled Montoya for liability purposes, the church would 
have received both direct and indirect benefits from Montoya’s 
service as a Primary teacher.166
b. Determining the proper duty to investigate volunteers. Because 
the three elements for determining duty are each satisfied, it is 
proper to apply a duty of care to the LDS Church for its Primary 
children. Nonetheless, the extent of that duty is unclear. While the 
safety and welfare of individual children from potential abuse 
mandates a greater duty on the part of a volunteer organization in its 
hiring of volunteers, an elevated duty including the performance of 
background checks on all volunteers working with children is not 
currently required of most volunteer organizations. The following 
weighs the arguments for an elevated duty of care for organizations 
employing volunteers with policy considerations and determines that 
while an elevated duty exists, the highest possible duty is not 
currently required of organizations employing volunteers. 
 (1) The vulnerability of children and the potential harm of 
abuse. As previously explained, if the employment offered is of a 
sensitive nature in which the health, safety, or welfare of a party is 
involved, then the duty of the employer to investigate potential 
 163. See HANDBOOK OF INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 19, at 229 (“Primary Enrollment: 
Children ages 3 through 11 are enrolled in Primary.”); see also id. at 235 (describing Primary 
enrollment and advancement). 
 164. See id. at 229. 
 165. Id. (“Primary leaders and teachers should love each child and develop a caring 
relationship with him or her.”). 
 166. See supra Part V.A.1. 
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volunteers is greater than in situations where the health, safety, or 
welfare of a party is not involved.167 Furthermore, tort law recognizes 
the vulnerability of children168 and requires a greater degree of care 
on the part of individuals and organizations working with them.169 
Children are potentially even more vulnerable in their interactions 
with volunteer organizations than in other relationships given the 
positions of authority and trust that volunteers occupy.170 For 
example, scoutmasters in the Boy Scouts occupy positions of 
authority over young men under circumstances in which discipline, 
order, and obedience are values the organization teaches and 
honors.171 In addition, volunteers serving in Big Brothers/Big Sisters 
of America serve in positions of great confidence and trust and often 
find themselves in one-on-one situations with their charges.172 The 
authority and confidence associated with these types of volunteer 
positions put children in an especially vulnerable situation if a leader 
is a potential perpetrator. 
An even more compelling reason for establishing a duty of care 
that adequately protects children is the “gravity of the harm” 
perpetrated on children on account of abuse.173 In addition to the 
horrific experience of the abuse itself, the harm of the abuse can 
extend far into the future. As explained by Dr. Julia Whealin, “If 
child sexual abuse is not effectively treated, long-term symptoms may 
persist into adulthood.”174 She further explained that the long-term 
results of child abuse include post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, 
depression and thoughts of suicide, sexual anxiety and disorders, 
poor body image and low self-esteem, increased likelihood of drug 
 167. Camacho, supra note 60, at 796. 
 168. Lear, supra note 14, at 173 (citing Tex. Utils. Elec. Co. v. Timmons, 947 S.W.2d 
191, 193 (Tex. 1997) (adopting Banker v. McLaughlin, 208 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex. 1948), 
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965))). 
 169. See Peyer v. Ohio Water Serv. Co., 720 N.E.2d 195, 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) 
(citing Di Gildo v. Caponi, 247 N.E.2d 732, 733–34 (Ohio 1969)) (“[C]hildren are entitled 
to a higher degree of care than adults and that the amount of care required to discharge a duty 
to a child is greater than that required to discharge a similar duty owed to an adult.”). 
 170. Lear, supra note 14, at 173. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. (citing Rob Lusk & Jill Waterman, Effects of Sexual Abuse on Children, in 
SEXUAL ABUSE OF YOUNG CHILDREN 101 (Kee MacFarlane et al. eds., 1986)). 
 174. Julia Whealin, Child Sexual Abuse: A National Center for PTSD Fact Sheet, National 
Center for PTSD, http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/facts/specific/fs_child_sexual_abuse.html (last 
visited on Mar. 17, 2006). 
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and alcohol abuse, self-mutilation, and eating disorders.175 The 
horrendous experience that is child abuse and the terrible and often 
permanent results of child abuse provide poignant reasons to impose 
a greater degree of care on organizations utilizing volunteers to work 
with children. 
 (2) Additional policy considerations. Weighed against the 
effects of child abuse are the social utility of volunteer organizations 
and the magnitude of the burden that would be placed on these 
organizations if extensive screening were required of them.176 
Volunteer organizations that work with children perform a vital 
function in society by “providing educational, recreational, and 
developmental activities for millions of youths each year.”177 The vast 
majority of volunteers that render their time and efforts to children 
and further the missions of volunteer organizations serve without any 
malevolent ulterior motive. This service not only benefits the 
children but also society as a whole by inculcating values in children 
and helping reduce the breadth and quantity of services that 
government would otherwise have to provide to youth. 
The decreased cost to government provided by volunteer 
organizations translates to lower costs for communities nationwide, 
but the imposition of a greater duty on volunteer organizations 
would likely result in greater costs, siphoning limited resources away 
from the organizations. Some authors have argued that because of 
increased accessibility there is a duty to perform criminal background 
checks where volunteers will work with children.178 Others have 
argued that a minimum reasonable background screening for a 
 175. Id. 
 176. The balance between protecting a small group of children from a terrible, life-
scarring experience with providing a much larger group with positive, but much less life-
changing, experiences is very difficult to do without coming out in favor of greater protections 
for children from potential perpetrators. However, the majority of states have done just that by 
not expressly mandating that all individuals that work with children pass through rigorous 
screening tests which include mandatory background checks. See Noy Davis & Susan Wells, 
Effective Screening of Child Care and Youth Service Workers, CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 22, 24 
(Winter/Spring 1994–95). Given that the majority of states do not require the highest degree 
of care from private organizations in hiring individuals to work with children, this analysis will 
apply an intermediate duty of care. In other words, a duty of care that requires some inquiry 
concerning the suitability of the volunteer, but does not require references or a background 
check. 
 177. Lear, supra note 14, at 180–81. 
 178. See id. at 174–75. 
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volunteer that will work with children “entails a formal application, a 
personal interview, and thorough reference checks.”179 Despite the 
fact that both state and federal governments have statutorily 
mandated background checks for many positions that have direct 
contact with children in either a supervisory or disciplinary capacity, 
no state currently statutorily mandates the screening of all volunteers 
that work in similar capacities with children.180
As explained by Mark Lear, “The main reason for the reluctance 
to impose [stricter screening duties], of course, is the fear that the 
costs entailed would drive the charitable organizations out of 
business.”181 While it is unlikely that a duty to perform criminal 
background checks would bankrupt the majority of volunteer 
organizations, it might force them to shift scarce resources to other 
purposes outside of the mission of the organization. 
Finally, an increased duty to screen does not necessarily translate 
into increased protection for children. Criminal background checks 
find people only if they have criminal histories. Given the fact that 
child abuse is one of the most underreported crimes—with as much 
as ninety percent of child abuse cases going unreported—the 
likelihood that criminal background checks would reveal many of the 
potential abusers is small.182 Because no state currently mandates the 
screening of all volunteers that will potentially work with children, 
this analysis will apply an intermediate duty of care in which the party 
should take greater care in hiring volunteers to work with children 
by interviewing potential candidates, receiving references from the 
potential candidates, and verifying the candidates’ past by inquiring 
of the references,183 but will not be required to perform formal 
criminal or civil background checks. 
c. Applying the duty of care to the LDS Church. A court applying 
an intermediate duty would likely find that the LDS Church did not 
comply with its duty in the case of Montoya. While courts could 
 179. See, e.g., id. at 173–74. 
 180. See Davis & Wells, supra note 176, at 24. 
 181. Id. at 177. 
 182. Federal Recordkeeping and Sex Offenders: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 44 (1996) (statement of Ernest E. Allen). 
 183. See Peyer v. Ohio Water Serv. Co., 720 N.E.2d 195, 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) 
(citing Di Gildo v. Caponi, 247 N.E.2d 732, 733–34 (Ohio 1969)) (“[C]hildren are entitled 
to a higher degree of care than adults and . . . the amount of care required to discharge a duty 
to a child is greater than that required to discharge a similar duty owed to an adult.”). 
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potentially articulate multiple degrees of care, this analysis will 
examine the situation of Aaron Montoya according to an 
intermediate degree of care.184 However, the selection process for 
Primary teachers likely would not satisfy even a less stringent duty of 
care. An intermediate standard would require that the LDS Church 
interview potential candidates, receive references from the potential 
candidates, and verify the candidates’ past by inquiring of the 
references.185
As briefly explained above, Primary teachers in the LDS Church 
are usually asked to serve through a bishop or one of his counselors 
based on the recommendations of the woman presiding over the 
Primary.186 Each call is subject to the bishop’s approval.187 For the 
most part, it is unlikely that a bishop, one of his counselors, or the 
Primary president would make extensive inquiries into the suitability 
of a candidate to volunteer in the Primary beyond speaking with the 
individual, speaking with the leaders in the ward concerning their 
suitability, and praying concerning that individual. 
The lack of research into the past of potential candidates would 
likely constitute a breach of the church’s duty of care to Montoya’s 
victims. At a minimum, courts have imputed to employers with 
similar hiring standards a duty to interview candidates and examine 
their references before hiring or accepting them as volunteers. While 
an informal interview likely occurred in the case of Aaron Montoya, 
it is unlikely that it was of the rigor demanded by this duty. 
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that Montoya’s bishop either asked 
for or received references for Montoya prior to extending to him the 
calling. Given these failures, the LDS Church likely breached its duty 
to Montoya’s victims. 
 184. Among the articles available concerning Aaron Montoya and the events surrounding 
his arrest, none of the articles indicate the specific manner in which Montoya was called as a 
Primary teacher. 
 185. See Peyer, 720 N.E.2d at 200. 
 186. HANDBOOK OF INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 19, at 231 (“The bishop calls and sets 
apart a woman to be the ward Primary president. The bishop of an assigned counselor calls and 
sets apart women to serve (1) as first and second counselor to the ward Primary president and 
(2) as secretary. A member of the bishopric also calls and sets apart men or women to serve as 
Primary teachers and in other ward Primary callings as needed. The Primary president makes 
recommendations for these callings, but they are subject to the bishopric’s approval.”). 
 187. Id. 
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3. Montoya’s incompetence to serve as a Primary teacher 
Following the determination of the LDS Church’s duty, the next 
inquiry is whether Montoya was incompetent to serve as a Primary 
teacher. The Montoya facts discussed earlier demonstrate Montoya’s 
undeniable incompetence as a Primary teacher.188
With regard to the tort of negligent hiring, “[i]ncompetence . . . 
is manifested by those qualities and characteristics that alert an 
employer that the hiring or retaining of an employee with such 
qualities or characteristics will or may imperil the safety of others.”189 
Furthermore, as explained above,190 negligence also extends to the 
reliability of the employee and “all that is essential to make up a 
‘reasonably’ safe person considering the nature of the work and the 
general safety of those who are required to associate with such 
person in the general employment.”191
While Montoya may have been competent in his employ as a 
bailiff at the Matheson Courthouse in Salt Lake City, Utah, he was 
undeniably incompetent to work with children in any capacity. 
Considering the fact that Montoya had previously molested other 
children, he was unquestionably unsafe as a volunteer that was to 
work with very young children in an often private setting. In the four 
years prior to his service as a Primary teacher, Montoya had sexually 
molested six different victims ranging in ages three to eleven.192
4. The LDS Church’s knowledge of Montoya’s incompetence 
Given these previous offenses, Montoya was incompetent to 
serve near or around children and could not fairly be described as a 
“reasonably” safe person to work with children. However, important 
questions remain concerning the LDS Church’s actual or 
constructive knowledge and the foreseeability of the molestation. His 
lack of a criminal record at the time the LDS Church called Montoya 
to be a Primary teacher and the fact that his previous victims had not 
spoken openly about Montoya’s abuse makes it doubtful that the 
LDS Church had either the actual or constructive knowledge of the 
 188. See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text. 
 189. Negligent Hiring and Retention, supra note 4, § 8. 
 190. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 191. Negligent Hiring and Retention, supra note 4, § 8 (quoting 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master 
and Servant § 310). 
 192. See Another Sentence, supra note 33, at B5. 
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threat Montoya posed to his class of Primary children that is required 
for liability.193 As explained above, actual knowledge of Montoya’s 
incompetence may be proved by demonstrating that the LDS 
Church possessed evidence of Montoya’s incompetence or that one 
of the church’s agents had personally witnessed Montoya’s 
incompetence.194 On the other hand, the LDS Church would have 
had constructive knowledge of Montoya’s incompetence if 
information indicating that Montoya was incompetent was available 
to the church and that the church would have known of this 
information if it had exercised reasonable care in hiring or retaining 
the incompetent.195
In the case of Aaron Montoya, it is unlikely that the LDS Church 
had either actual or constructive notice of his pedophilia. Given 
general church policy, if the bishop in Montoya’s ward had been 
aware of the prior offenses, he would not have placed Montoya in a 
position where Montoya could potentially reoffend.196 In addition, 
on account of the law in most states, including Utah, if a bishop 
were aware of Montoya’s previous offenses, he would be required to 
report them to the state.197 Given the fact that Montoya had no 
criminal record at the time of his arrest,198 it can be assumed that no 
such reporting took place. Furthermore, the absence of a criminal 
record would support the conclusion that Montoya’s ecclesiastical 
leaders did not have constructive knowledge of Montoya’s 
pedophilia, and that further inquiry on the part of the LDS Church 
would likely not have resulted in any indication that Montoya was a 
danger to the children in his class. Finally, Montoya’s prior victims 
had not made public Montoya’s molestation, so information was not 
available from his victims or their families at the time Montoya’s 
bishop called him as a Primary teacher.199
 193. See Negligent Hiring and Retention, supra note 4, § 9. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. 
 196. This is, of course, an assumption. Montoya’s bishop could have placed him in the 
Primary to serve with children with either actual or constructive knowledge of Montoya’s 
pedophilia. In addition, such a violation of general church policy would support a claim on the 
part of one of the children Montoya molested that there was both knowledge of his pedophilia 
and a breach of duty on the part of the bishop. 
 197. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (2003). 
 198. Linda Thomson, Ex-Deputy Will Remain in Custody, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 12, 
2005, at B3, available at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,600111617,00.html. 
 199. See Another Sentence, supra note 33, at B5. 
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However, the preceding argument is contingent upon several 
assumptions, including, but not limited to, that an examination of 
references would not have uncovered Montoya’s pedophilia, that 
none of Montoya’s traits or characteristics would have hinted at his 
pedophilia, and that the bishop did not have actual knowledge of 
Montoya’s propensities. If any of the above assumptions is faulty,200 
the LDS Church likely would have had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the danger Montoya posed to children. However, 
assuming that the above assumptions are correct, the LDS Church 
would not have had either actual or constructive knowledge, and, 
therefore, would not be liable for his tortious and criminal actions. 
5. The actual and proximate cause of the molestation 
Because it is unlikely that the LDS Church either actually or 
constructively knew of Montoya’s previous offenses or his pedophilia 
problem, questions surrounding causation are moot in his case; 
however, an examination regarding causation is still valuable for 
purposes of the general discussion. 
To prevail against the LDS Church, a potential plaintiff would 
have to demonstrate that “his or her injuries were a logical 
consequence of a specific act of negligence or intentional act by the 
employee and that this act was a natural and logical consequence of 
the employee’s incompetence that was known, either actually or 
constructively, by the employer.”201 As in the example of the 
maintenance employee with prior convictions for assault and battery 
who was sent to the home of a client to fix an appliance and 
subsequently assaulted the client,202 placing a known child abuser in 
a private room with children would establish more than a sufficient 
causal link to satisfy this requirement. However, if Montoya had 
previous convictions at the time of his calling for nonviolent or white 
collar crimes, and the LDS Church subsequently placed him in the 
Primary as a teacher, it is doubtful that an act of pedophilia would 
 200. As explained above, the limited information provided through the news media did 
not provide information concerning the actual or constructive knowledge of Montoya’s 
ecclesiastical leaders. Therefore, the above facts are based partly on assumption. 
 201. Negligent Hiring and Retention, supra note 4, § 10 (citing Bensman v. Reed, 20 
N.E.2d 910 (Ill. App. Ct. 1939); Halsan v. Johnson, 65 P.2d 661 (Or. 1937)). 
 202. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
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have been sufficiently foreseeable as the proximate cause of the 
molestation.203
In summary, four of the five requirements for liability under the 
tort of negligent hiring would likely be satisfied under the currently 
known facts of the Montoya case given that (1) the LDS Church 
maintains sufficient control over its volunteer Primary teachers to 
create an employment relationship, (2) the LDS Church has a duty 
to the children within the Primary that was likely breached by the 
bishop’s failure to sufficiently investigate Montoya’s background 
prior to inviting him to serve as a teacher, (3) Montoya was clearly 
incompetent to work with children, and (4) his employment was the 
proximate and actual cause of the victims’ injuries. However, based 
on the assumptions stated above, the LDS Church would not be 
liable in this case for the tort of negligent hiring because the bishop 
had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of Montoya’s 
pedophilia. 
B. The First Amendment and the Tort of Negligent Hiring 
An action for negligent hiring against the LDS Church would 
also likely fail on First Amendment grounds. Federal and state 
jurisdictions throughout the United States disagree concerning the 
applicability of the tort of negligent hiring to religious institutions.204 
However, an honest application of precedent to the Montoya case 
would likely result in the First Amendment barring such an action 
given the unavoidable entanglement of church and state that would 
result in a court’s examination of internal church policies and 
decisions. Extensive case law exists concerning the applicability of the 
First Amendment; however, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has 
not yet resolved the issue of whether the First Amendment protects a 
religious institution from liability when a church employee engages 
in tortious conduct against a third-party.”205 As a result, a 
 203. See Negligent Hiring and Retention, supra note 4, § 10 (illustrative examples). 
 204. See supra notes 126–33 and accompanying text. 
 205. Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 357 (Fla. 2002). As explained by a judge on the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court with regard to the applicability of third-party tort actions to 
religious institutions, “It is generally acknowledged that this area of the First Amendment law 
is in flux and the United States Supreme Court cases offer very limited guidance.” Pritzlaff v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 794 (Wis. 1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
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tremendous split among state and federal courts exists with regard to 
actions for negligent hiring against a religious institution.206
In determining whether the First Amendment will bar negligent 
hiring actions against religious institutions, the key determination in 
reported case law has been whether the action would result in an 
excessive entanglement of church and state.207 As explained above, a 
Lemon Establishment Clause inquiry has three separate prongs: (1) 
whether the governmental action had a secular purpose, (2) whether 
the action’s primary effect is neither to enhance nor inhibit religion, 
and (3) whether the action does not foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.208 To determine whether the 
entanglement is excessive a court must “examine the character and 
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid 
that the state provides, and the resulting relationship between the 
government and the religious authority.”209
In the case of Montoya and the LDS Church, the application of 
tort principles to the LDS Church would likely be barred by the First 
Amendment because it would require judicial examination of the 
church’s internal policies and procedures. In an action for negligent 
hiring against the LDS Church, an examining court would have to 
examine the procedure for extending assignments within the church, 
the role of the bishop in extending assignments, whether the bishop 
acted reasonably within his responsibilities, and other internal 
policies and procedures. As one court explained, “It is well-settled 
that when a court is required to interpret Canon Law or internal 
church policies and practices, the First Amendment is violated 
because such judicial inquiry would constitute excessive government 
 206. See Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1256–61 
(Miss. 2005) (Appendices A and B provide cases from the individual states and circuits that 
have either held that the First Amendment is or is not a bar to an action for negligent hiring). 
See generally Joseph B. Conder, Annotation, Liability of Church or Religious Society for Sexual 
Misconduct of Clergy, 5 A.L.R. 5th 530 (1993). 
 207. See, e.g., Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that 
determination involved excessive entanglement between church and state, and thus was 
precluded under the Establishment Clause of First Amendment); Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 347 
(finding that under these facts excessive entanglement would not result, and if it would result it 
was excused by the application of neutral principles of law). 
 208. Kelty, supra note 115, at 1127 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–
613, 615 (1971)). 
 209. Id. 
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entanglement with religion.”210 The court further explained that 
“[a]ny inquiry into the policies and practices of the Church 
Defendants in hiring and supervising their clergy raises the same kind 
of First Amendment problems . . . , which might involve the Court 
in making sensitive judgments about the propriety of the Church 
Defendants’ supervision in light of their religious beliefs.”211 
Consequently, the court held that applying the standards of care 
necessary in a negligent hiring cause of action “would violate both 
the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clauses” because it 
“would inevitably require examination of church policy and 
doctrine . . . with an intent to pass on their reasonableness.”212
In Gibson v. Brewer, the Missouri State Supreme Court provided 
a similar rationale for disallowing actions against churches for the 
tort of negligent hiring.213 While the court affirmed that churches 
may be held civilly liable,214 it conditioned that potential liability on 
the application of neutral principles of law “without determining 
questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”215 The Missouri 
Supreme Court then held that judicial inquiry into a religious 
institution’s practices of hiring, retaining, and ordaining necessarily 
involve an impermissible judicial interpretation of constitutionally 
protected religious activities that would inhibit religion.216 
Furthermore, the court held that “judicial inquiry into hiring, 
ordaining, and retaining clergy would result in an endorsement of 
 210. Ayon, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1249 (quoting Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 
1138, 1150 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 
696 (1976), “and numerous other cases”)). 
 211. Id. (citing Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). The court 
also cited Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1431 (N.D. Iowa 1997), which held that “who 
may become or remain a priest must, almost inevitably involve an inquiry into church doctrine 
or policies, barring a negligent hiring or retention claim on First Amendment grounds.” Ayon, 
47 F. Supp. 2d at 1249. 
 212. Ayon, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1250. The court held that it would violate the Free Exercise 
Clause because “[t]he choice of individuals to serve as ministers is one of the most 
fundamental rights belonging to a religious institution. It is one of the most important 
exercises of a church’s freedom from government control.” Id. Furthermore, the court held 
that the Establishment Clause would be violated because “[t]he application of even general 
tort law principles to church procedures on the choice of priests would require an inquiry into 
present practices with an intent to pass on their reasonableness.” Id. 
 213. 952 S.W.2d 239, 246–48 (Mo. 1997). 
 214. Id. (citing H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)). 
 215. Id. at 246 (citing Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)). 
 216. Id. at 246–47. 
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religion, by approving one model for church hiring, ordination, and 
retention of clergy.”217
On similar constitutional grounds the Wisconsin State Supreme 
Court in Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee barred an action for 
negligent hiring and retention.218 After determining that such an 
action would necessarily require a court to interpret “church canons 
and internal church policies and procedures,” the court continued by 
explaining that an examination for negligent hiring and retention 
would require “the court to create a ‘reasonable bishop’ norm.”219 It 
then explained that determining the reasonableness of a bishop is 
complicated by “beliefs in penance, admonition and reconciliation,” 
as well as other beliefs such as mercy towards an offender.220
While the case of Montoya differs from the above-cited cases in 
that Montoya was not a member of a full-time clergy such as is 
found in the Catholic Church, a court examining this case for the 
negligent hiring of Montoya would still be excessively entangled 
with the LDS Church because the court would have to examine the 
bishop’s actions and corresponding church policies. To determine if 
Montoya’s bishop was negligent in calling him to serve as a Primary 
teacher, a court would likely have to examine, at a minimum, the 
process by which the bishop decided to call Montoya and his wife, 
the interview in which the calling was extended, any information that 
emerged through the interview, LDS policy concerning the process 
in which individuals are extended callings to work with children, 
LDS policy concerning who is qualified to serve with children, and 
other questions surrounding internal policy. Not only would the 
court have to ask if the bishop acted as a reasonable bishop given the 
circumstances and what he knew or could have discovered 
concerning Montoya, it would also have to examine LDS policies to 
determine whether they are reasonable and whether they provide a 
proper standard of care with regard to children. Since bishops are 
encouraged to call individuals by and through spiritual 
manifestation, an examination of church policy and bishops’ actions 
 217. Id. at 247 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–33 (1997)). 
 218. 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995). 
 219. Id. (quoting James T. O’Reilly & Joann M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct: 
Confronting the Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 31, 47 (1994)). 
 220. Id. 
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calls into question the very heart of LDS doctrine.221 Consequently, 
efforts on the part of a court in determining the reasonableness of 
the actions of an LDS bishop in calling an individual such as 
Montoya could potentially result in the creation of judicially imposed 
standards of care that both curtail the religious freedom of and 
impose governmental control over religious institutions. 
In the face of these inherent challenges, several courts have 
permitted actions of negligent hiring based upon the idea that the 
courts are merely applying neutral principles of law.222 However, this 
application of the neutral principles of law exception should be 
rejected given the excessive entanglement that results from an 
examination of internal church policies and procedures and the 
problems surrounding a reasonable bishop norm. For instance, in 
Ayon v. Gourley, the plaintiffs encouraged the court to allow an 
action for negligent hiring to go forward against an archdiocese 
based on Employment Division of Human Resources v. Smith in which 
the Supreme Court held that a court may apply “neutral principles” 
of law to religious institutions.223 However, the district court held 
that Smith’s neutral principles exception, while valid, was “not very 
helpful under the facts as alleged . . . [because] Plaintiff’s claims rely 
on general tort liability theories, which do not fit the description of 
‘valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability.’”224 As explained by 
the district court, “[t]he law at issue in Smith was a straightforward 
prohibition on the possession of certain specified controlled 
substances. Consequently, the law in that case does not translate well 
to a situation in which the Defendants are charged with . . . 
negligent hiring and/or supervision.”225
 221. In response to an inquiry by President Martin Van Buren concerning how the LDS 
Church differed from all other churches, Joseph Smith, the LDS Church’s founder, responded 
that “we differ[] in mode of baptism, and the gift of the Holy Ghost by the laying on of 
hands.” JOSEPH SMITH, 4 HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS 42 (2d ed., rev. 1980). The LDS Church’s reliance on the Holy Ghost as a revelatory 
tool also has a doctrinal basis outside of basic church policy. See, e.g., Moroni 6:9 (“And their 
meetings were conducted by the church after the manner of the workings of the Spirit, and by 
the power of the Holy Ghost . . . .”). 
 222. See supra notes 127–28. 
 223. Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1248 (D. Colo. 1998) (citing Employment 
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). 
 224. Id. at 1248–49 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 879). 
 225. Id. at 1249. 
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However, many courts have accepted and applied the neutral 
principles of law exception in the case of religious institutions and 
third-party tort liability.226 For example, the Florida Supreme Court 
explained, 
Substantial authority in both the state and federal courts concludes 
that the right to religious freedom and autonomy protected by the 
First Amendment is not violated by permitting the courts to 
adjudicate tort liability against a religious institution based on a 
claim that a clergy member engaged in tortious conduct such as 
sexual assault and battery in the course of his or her relationship 
with a parishioner.227
The Florida Supreme Court further stated that “[t]hese courts 
conclude that there is no impermissible interpretation of religious 
doctrine because the courts are applying a neutral principle of 
generally applicable tort law.”228
The Florida Supreme Court’s justification in part was that 
neutral principles may be applied to the church because the actions 
of the clergy member were outside the scope of employment and 
well outside church practices and beliefs.229 Other courts have also 
applied tort principles to and examined church policies and actions 
on the basis that the offender’s actions were outside accepted church 
beliefs.230 However, such a conclusion would logically justify the 
examination only of the offender’s actions, not those of the church. 
While the actions of the offending employee or volunteer would 
clearly be outside of the scope of almost all religious doctrine, the 
examination that would result for the tort of negligent hiring is not 
of the offender’s actions but of the actions of the church and its 
representatives in engaging the offender. Rather than being outside 
the scope of the church’s doctrine and internal policies and 
procedures, such an examination unavoidably passes judgment on 
 226. See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 358 (Fla. 2002). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. Furthermore, the court explained that “[t]his is especially so where the religious 
institution does not allege that the conduct was undertaken in furtherance of a sincerely held 
religious belief.” Id. 
 229. Id.; see also Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996); 
Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993); Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 
2002); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 
 230. See, e.g., Martinez v. Primera Asemblea de Dios, No. 05-96-01458-CV, 1998 WL 
242412 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding that First Amendment grants no immunity to church or 
clergy for secular based torts such as sexual assault). 
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the propriety of such, and, therefore, results in the excessive 
entanglement of church and state. 
In addition, as explained by the Supreme Court of Maine, those 
courts that have ruled that resolution of negligent supervision claims 
against churches is possible by applying neutral principles of law 
without determining questions of church law and policy “have not 
fully addressed the fundamental issue.”231 The court explained that 
even assuming a court could determine a religious institution’s 
control over an individual without determining questions of “church 
doctrine or polity,” additional constitutional obstacles remain.232 The 
court noted the unavoidable result of such an examination: 
The imposition of secular duties and liability on the church as a 
“principal” will infringe upon its right to determine the standards 
governing the relationship between the church, its bishop, and the 
parish priest. “Beliefs in penance, admonition and reconciliation as 
a sacramental response to sin may be the point of attach by a 
challenger who wants a court to probe the tort-law reasonableness 
of the church’s mercy toward the offender. . . .”233
The court further explained that because constitutionally 
protected beliefs govern the relationship between a church and its 
clergy, members of the clergy constitutionally cannot be treated as 
any other common law employee.234 Because different 
denominations have “their own intricate principles of governance as 
to which the state has no rights of visitation, . . . [i]t would . . . be 
inappropriate and unconstitutional” for a court to attempt to 
determine, after the fact, whether ecclesiastical authorities acted 
negligently in hiring an individual.235 Furthermore, the Maine State 
Supreme Court argued that the ultimate danger in determining the 
reasonability of the actions of religious institutions in hiring an 
individual was that an award of damages “would have a chilling 
effect leading indirectly to state control over the future conduct of 
affairs of a religious denomination.”236 In other words, the result of 
imposing liability upon religious institutions for deviations “from the 
 231. Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 444 (Me. 1997). 
 232. Id. at 444–45. 
 233. Id. at 445 (citations omitted). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
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secular standard is to impair the free exercise of religion and to 
control denominational governance.”237
The application of tort principles to religious institutions in 
third-party tort actions results in tangible impairments to the free 
exercise of religion and governmental control of churches. Given the 
excessive entanglement that would result in a court’s examination of 
the LDS Church’s internal policies and procedures surrounding the 
extending of callings, and the governmental control that would 
result from such an examination, the First Amendment should bar an 
action against the LDS Church for the negligent hiring of Montoya 
as a Primary teacher. 
In summary, in the case of Montoya and the LDS Church, there 
are two independent grounds on which the church should not be 
liable under the tort of negligent hiring. First, the church likely had 
neither actual nor constructive knowledge of Montoya’s pedophilia. 
Furthermore, as is shown above, if not for the First Amendment, the 
tort of negligent hiring would apply to the LDS Church and its 
volunteer Primary teachers because a right to control the teachers 
exists on the part of the LDS Church. However, given the excessive 
entanglement that would result from judicial inquiry into the 
reasonableness of LDS leaders in calling individuals to different 
capacities, the First Amendment should block an action for negligent 
hiring. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Without question, the offenses committed by Aaron Marcos 
Montoya against the young members of his Primary class were 
horrendous and appalling. Montoya deservedly will spend a 
substantial part of his life in prison because of his pedophilia. 
However, to impute Montoya’s crimes to the LDS Church is 
improper. While Montoya was undoubtedly incompetent to serve as 
a Primary teacher, the LDS Church likely did not have either actual 
or constructive knowledge of Montoya’s pedophilia, and, therefore, 
cannot be held liable for negligently hiring and retaining him. More 
importantly, the First Amendment would likely preclude such an 
action against the LDS Church since the Establishment Clause 
prohibits excessive entanglement between church and state that 
would unavoidably occur if a court were to examine the church’s 
 237. Id.  
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internal policies and procedures in extending callings to church 
members. This outcome is supported by the impairment of free 
exercise and the governmental control that would result from a 
court’s examination of church policies and the actions of a church’s 
leaders in fulfilling doctrinally based roles within the church. 
Morgan Fife
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